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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

EDITH M. LANGLOIS,

Plaintiff and Appellant1
Case Nor
9054

vs.

NORMAN T. REES,
Defendant and Respondent .

Brief of Plaintiff and Appellant

STATEMF.NT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff and appellant \vill be referred to as plaintiff
or in her own name, and the defen dan t and respondent v..~ i1 t
be referred to as defendant or in his own name.
All italics are ours.

The plaintiff, Edith M. Langlois, brought this action
against Nor man T. Rees for injuries she sustained when struck
by an automobile driven by the defendant. The accident oc ~
3
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curred on the .25th day of JYlarch, 1958, at. about 4~ ~0 p.ru.+
Mrs. ianglois was walking east across an unmarked crosswalk
from the west side of State Street to the east, on the south side
of the intersection of t'irst Avenue.
In her com plaint, the plaintiff complained the de£ en~ant
v.ra.s negligent in (a) failure to yield the right-of-way) (b)
traveling too fast for existing con.ditions, (c) failure to have

his automobile under control) and (d) failure to keep a. proper
lookout.
The defendant ans";;~lered~ denying negligence and claimed

that the in j u rie5

v.,T cr e

contributed to

hy

the negligence of the

plaintiff.
The issu~s created by the pleadings and the pretrial order
as am ended were as follows: The plaintiff claimed defendant
was negligent in (a) f~l~re t~. yield right·of-way, (b) travel-

ing too fast for existing conditions, (~) failure to keep his

car under con troI so as to avoid striking pia in tiff~ (d) fall ure
to keep a proper 1oo kou t~ (e) f ai I ure to keep his windshield
properly clear so he could see what was on the highway to be
seen, and (f) plain tiff is en ti tlcd to recover on the last clear
chanc: e doctrine.· De£ endant ~ s contentions were that plaintiff
(a) failed to yield the right-of-way to defendant and (b)
failed to keep a proper lookout) and cited Section 41-6· 79,
subsections (a) and (c)~ V~C.A. 1953~ and defenda.pt denied
he was negligent
The case came on for tria 1 before a jury on the 3rd and
4th days of March~ 1959+ Exhibit 1, a map of the intersection

dra~Tn by an engineer) was admitted in evidence~ and Exhibits
2, 3l 4, and 5~ a 11 pictures of the intersection l were admitted·+
4
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The court refused to give the following instructions re-

quested by p1ain tiff:
No. 1, plain tiff's request that the court ho1d defendant negil
gent as a matter of law, and direct a verdict for the plaintifL
w

No.2
The mere fact tb at the plain tiff was not in the
marked crosswalk at the time she v.ras struck by defendant"s automobile will not relieve the defendant
from liability unless she v.; as gu i1 ty of other contrib utory negligence that proximately resulted in her inJUries.
And the following two instructions from J.lFC:

It is the duty of the driver of an automobile to yield.
the right~of~way to a pedestrian crossing the road~vay
within any tnarked crosswalk) or within any crosswalk even if it is not marked at the end of any block.
failure to so yield the right-of-way to a pedestrian
in any such crossv..T alk "V~t~"ould cons ti tu te negligence.
JIFU 20.6.
As to locality on a roadway such as that involved
in this case, these factors enter in to consideration of
the question of ~,..hat conduct is required of a pedestrian
in the exercise of or dina.ry care in crossing a high 'va y.
L If he crosses within a marked crossvlalk, or at an
intersection within a crosswalk, whether marked or
not, the law requires the driver o£ all vehicles to yield
the right- of vra y to him.
r

2+ If he crosses at any other place, the Jaw requires

him to yield the right~of~way to all vehides on the
roadway so near as to constitute an immediate hazard~
although this requirement does not relieve the driver
of a vehicle from the duty to exercise ordinary care
for the safety. of any pedestrian upon a roadway.

5
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3. The atnount of caution :required to constitute
ordinary care increases as does the danger that a reasonably prudent person, in like positionJ would a_ppre~
l1cnd 1n the situation. For example, he--d.vy vehicular
traffic, fast traffic, poo.r visibility, obstructions to view,.
~ret pavement-any of these or any other perceivable
factor increasing the ha:.card, increases the amount of
caution vlhich an ordinary prudent person would use.

JIFlJ 20.8.
No.5
It is not enough that a driver be able to stop within
the range of his vision or that he use diligence to. stop
after discerning an object. The rule makes no allowance
for delay in action. He must, on peril of legal negli·
gence, so drive that he can actually discover an object~
perform the n€cessary acts necessary to stopping~ and
bring the car to a complete ha It within such range if
necessary to avoid. collision with and injury to others
on the high way. If his vision is obscured by snow~
sleet or fog on the windshield or windows so that he
·cannot see the required distance ahead, .or to the side
as the case rna y be~ he must) within such distance from
tb e point of such lack of vision, bring his car to such
control that he can stop imtnediately~ and if he cannot
then sec, .shou1d 5top.-72 A~L.R. 1352.

r he

fall ov.rin g are instructions of the court pertinent to
plain tiff s claims in this case :
!

1

No.4
It was the duty of defendant Norman T+ Rees to
use reasonable care under the circumstances of this
case in driving his automobile to avoid danger to himself and others and to observe and be aware of the
condition of the high Via y, traffic thereon and other
existing conditions and particularly with respect to
the particulars of .negligence charged by the plaintiff,
6
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he 'vas obliged to observe due care in all respects as
to the following:

(a) Not to travel too fast for existing conditionsr
(b) To keep his car un de.r reasona b1e, sa£e and
proper contra 1.
(c) To keep a lookout for conditions reasonably to
be anticipated ahead of him.

(d) To keep his windshield reasonably cJear so that
he could see what was on the highway to be seenT
With respect to the allegation that defendant failed
to yield the right~of-\vay~ the court instructs you that
that allegation is not applicable because of an instruc~
tion tn that regard which ~rill be given to you.
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence
that defendant was negligent in one or more of the
foregoing four partkulars ( right-of.,vay being excluded) and that such neg Jigencc V/ as the proximate cause of
the accident and of plaintiff's injuries then unless you
find a] so that plain tiff is bnr red from recovering from
defendant because of her contributory negligence~ upon
which sub j crt you will also be instructed) your verdict
shall be for the plaintiff and against the defendant.
No~

6

At the time of this accident, one of the la\vs of Utah read
as follows:
·'Be tween adjacent in tcrsect ions at w h 1ch traffic control signals are in operation; pedestrians shall not cross
at any place except in a marked cross\valk.~'

l ; nder this la v.l, plain tiff \\'Tas prohibited from cross~
ing State Street at any point other than the marked
crossw aJ k on the north side of the intersection of State
Street and F rrst Avenue, and since it is admitted that
she dicl not attempt to use the marked cross~~alk at
7
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that point, the court rules that she violated the above
law and that such a violation constituted negligence .
....

No.7
Utah Ia w requires that a pedestrian crossing th~
street at a point other than v.,r ithin a marked crossw~lk
or 'vi thin an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection~
must yield the right-of-,vay to all automobiles apw
proachin g so near as to constitute an im mediate hazard~

The parties have stipulated and agreed that at the
point v,.r here plaintiff \~·as. crossing~ there was no marked
crosswalk. Thj s court instructs you that the place where
plaintiff ·was attempting to cross State Street was not
'·an unrnar ked eros swalk at an intersection,'' as those
terms are used in Utah law, and therefore plaintiff
was required to yie1d the right-of-way to defendant, s
approaching automobile. Therefore, if you find that
defendant's automobile was so near as to constitute
an inuned1ate hazard and that the plaintiff did not
yield the right-of.way, she was negligent~

No.8
Regardless of the court· s instruction tba t plaintiff
was guilty of negligence in crossing where she did
and regard i es s of v.,T h ether you shall determine that
she ~:as negligent in failing to yield the right~of-way
to defendant, if you do so determine, the court instructs
you that be£ ore either or both of such acts of ne gligence wiJl bar pi ain tiH from recovering her damages
f ron1 clef end ant you must .first find that either one or
both of such acts of negligence was a proximate~ con~r i ~ utory cause of the accident and of plaintiff's in~
JUnes+
If you find this issue against defendant and for the
plaintiff and if you also shall have found against the
defendant and for the plaintiff with respect to the
8
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allegations of defendant's negligence then you may
assess plain tiffs damages under the instructions to
be given you ih that regard
r

con tr ibu tory negligence
the defendant you will
and fin d. v.,· h ether plain~
is excused by reason of
the rules of v.rhat is known in the law as the Last CJ ear
Chance Rule.
If you find the issue of
against the plaintiff and for
yet be required to determine
tifFs contributory negligence

~{).

9 was the instruction as to the la.s t c1ear
chance. We are not including No. 1, 2, 3, and 5, nor the stock
Ins ttuctio n

instructions.
The case \vas submitted to the jury and they returned a

verdict of no ca usc of action. Thereafter th c plain tlff made a
motion for new trial which \Vas by the court denied on April 6~
:1

1959~ and thereafter, within

the time required by law, the
plaintiff fi 1ed her appeal to the Supreme Court.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

First Avenue intersects with North State Street but does
not cross State Street. First Avenue from curb to curb is fifty~
eight feet, six inches. ~-ide. The north and south traffic on State
Street is divided by double lines, and there are two lanes for
the northbound traffic and two lanes for the southbound traffic.
There is a marked pedestrian crossing on the north side of the
intersection crossing State Street, and there .is a sign on the
northeast corner of State Street~ facing north and south, mar ked
-=~pedestrian lane.t' The sidewalk on the south side of First
Avenue is twelve feet \Vide and there is not a marked cr055.lng
at that point to the west side of State Street. There wa.s no
9
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sign or barrier on either side .indicating that a p~rson should
not cross at that point (see ex hi bits) There is a s t~p sign on
First Avenue on the northeast corner of the 1nters ection for
traffic going ~Test on First A venue (see Exhibit 1, .a map of
the area~ and Exhibits 2J 3~ 4, and 5, pictures of the area)
There are traffic con tro I signals at South Temple and State
Street and at North 'Temple and State Street.
7

I

The accident occurred while the plaintiff was crossing
State Street in the unmarked crosswalk on the south side of
the intersection of First Avenue and State Street.
The plain tiff in this case is a 'v ido~T. She was eighty wfour
years of age at the time of the accident. Sn e 1i ved at the Gate~va y Apartments at 28 North State Street and had lived there
for eleven years (R. 57).

The plaintiff knew there Vv·as a crosswalk on the north
side of the street and knevl that it had painted lines and knew
that it was by the stores (R~ 68). She knew that people used
the south cross\valk~ Almost everybody used it, and this had .
been going on for the eleven years she had lived there
59, 60j and 69)

(R.

56~

+

On the day of the accident, March 25 ~ 195 8, the phllntiff
went to the L.D.S. Temple early in the morning~ The weather
~Tas n icc ~Then sh c went but it \Vas raining and snowing when
she started home about 4: 00 p.m. She v.,ralked up through the

general offices of the Mutual and through the little alley
onto the west sidewalk of State Street.. She turned south and
walked just beyond the post which is a little north of the
north boundary of the unmarked south eros sing across State
Street (R. 58-61)
I

10
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She looked

up and down to see if there were any cars~ and

there weren't any. There was no car coming down First Avenue
that had entered the intersection and so she decided to cross~
She started to go across and she was knocked down and knocked
unconscous ( R. 59) . She was. walking straight east to\vard

the sidewalk (R .61).
Norman T. Rees, the

defendant~

lived at 402 .First Avenue

and was twenty -five years old a.nd single. He had driven a car
since he was eighteen years old and had a Utah driver's license!
restricted to wearing glasses when he drove (R. 30).
On March 25, 1958, the day of the accident, he had a

two-door green Chatnpion 1950 Studebaker that had been
driven 70 ~ 000 to 80,000 miles~ He drove vlest on First A venue
in order to get to 35 Ric:ha.rds Street where he vlorked. He
tes ti.fi. ed that visibility was poor and the snow was plastering
on the \Vindshield, a wet~ heavy snow (R. 34). His right front

window and left front wiodol-Y were fogged. He could only
see through the sweep of the windshield wiper on the

\V ind.

shield (R. 38). He could see straight ahead . . but he had diffic:ul ty
seeing to the left or right. As he went down First Avenue
approaching State Street~ he v.tas in the lane next to the center~
He knew about the stop sign on State Street and First Avenue
{R~

35).
He stopped at the stop

sign~ according to his testimony l

and after looking to the north and south and there was no
traffic, made his turn. He said he made a normal left hand
turn (R. 36) Defendant Rees didn't know exactly v..~hat part
r

of the street Mrs. Langlois, the plaintiff~ was in. By that, he
meant ho~ far south she was. He said she was three or four
11
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feet from the curb when he first saw her and that she was

walking .ln an easterly direction (R. 36-37). He said Mrs.
Langlois ~Tas v.ralking about medium speed.
On the map he made a mark that would be about forty

feet from where he claimed was the point of impact. There
he made the turn. Hov.rever, he said he didn't see her until
he ~vas about ten or t\\·elve feet from her. As he was going
around the turn onto State StreetJ he v.'as unable to see Mrs.
Langlois ( R. 4 7) ~ He first saw her about three

01

four feet

east of the 'vest curb and she was hit fowteen feet west of the
east curb. He .figured he was going ten or fifteen miles pet
hour as he star ted to make the turn. The de£ endant admitted
that in his deposition he said he struck her about even with
the south sidewalk of First Avenue. 1~he defendant was very

familiar with the intersection and he had seen people go across
the unmarked cross\val.k. However, he said they were jaywafk..

ing

(R. 51)+

He testified that ~1rs. L~glois had a pie<:e of newspaper
over her head to protect herself from the snow and that from
the tim c he first saw her when she was three· or four feet
from the curb~ he· never took his eyes off her and that she
didn't turn her head~ change her pace~ or stop (Rr 52). He
¥/as doing everything he could to stop his car (R. 48 and 53)~
and when he stopped she \Vas lying down with her head to the
south and her feet to the north.

He picked up the new spa per and put it in his car. However, he didn't discuss that with the officer or show ic to him
(R. 55)+
11
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He did not recall looking across the street before he
made his move from the stop sign and he didn't recall seeing
the plaintiff before she left the sidewalk and he didn~t believe

that he honked his horn (R. 56-57).
Officer Proctor Lesco e \Vas a police officer and he had been

for two years. On that date he was assigned to accident investigation (R. 15). He arrived at the intersection at 4:39 p.m.
and when he arrived he saw the defendant's automobile and
Mrs. Langlois and the police ambulance. ·He testified that it
was snowing a wet snow. He measured where Mrs. Langlois
was~ and she \Vas tVvvelve feet south of the south edge of the
extended side'-'ra 1k and the ca [ 'vas eleven feet ( R~ 15 and 16) .
He talked to tbc defendant in the police car and the
clefen dan t told him his estimate of his speed as he made his 1eft

turn was fifteen miles per hour~ and that he first observed the
pedestrian thirty lo far!J feel awaJ, and that the impact speed
at the time of the collision was five to ten miles per hour. His
general statement to Mr. Lescoe was:
~~I

v.ras stopped at the stop sign on First Avenue and
State. I looked both ways; no cars were coming so I
made a left turn. Didn't see her until I was almost on
top of her. There v..-·as some frost on my right front
window~" (R+17) +

According to the

map~ Ivlr. Lescoe said that 1\lrs. Langlois

was about fourteen feet east of the "V-.!T est curb of State Street.
0 n cross examination by defendant's counsel, Mr. Lescoe stated
that he didn~t find aO¥thing at the scene o£ the accident indicating that defendant~ s estimate o £ his speed was not pro per.
Mr. Lescoe said that if the defendant sav..T the plaintiff three

13
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or four feet away and was going .fifteen miles per hour, he
couldn't have reduced his speed to five or ten miles per hour
in three or four feet. He said that at fifteen miles per hour it
would take twenty-five to thirty feet to stop, and at five miles
per hour it v,rould take 5even feet or probably ten feet on wet
pavement (~~ 19-24) .
Mr. Lescoe said tb at according to his measurements that

day she \vas about twelve feet west of the east curb Jine, but
according to Exhibit 1 (the engineer's drawing) it would be
fourteen feet west (R. 19).
Mrs. Langlois was taken by the ambulance over to the
Clinic and

·or+ Crockett waul dn' t

let her in. He said she would

have to go to the hospital. She passed out and didn't remember:

anything until she was ln bed in the L. D .Sr Hospital~ where
5he :stayed for about three days. They took X -rays and put on
a cast.
She used crutches for a few days and then a cane. She was
bruised all over (R. 60~6 2) . She was sore and her ankle pained
some and she had to stay in bed a good deal of the time for a

few days. Her daughter stayed with her for several weeks. She
kept the cast on during that time and used a cane for about
three months+

She ~"ent to England io Augustl 1958~ and in England
she seemed to get along pretty well (R~ 63~64)
+

She didn t recall having a newspaper over her head.
t

Dr. ThoJnas E. Bauman, an orthopedic surgeon with the
Salt Lake C llnic ~ testified that he sa \v Mrs. Langlois at the
L.D.S. Hospital on March 25~ 1958, and he examined her.
14
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She had a fracture of the latetal malleolus and she was treated
w 1th a plaster cast and bed rest for dizziness. She had a short
leg cast put on and V~t'Ore it until May, 1958~ when it \vas taken
off and her recovery was very satisfactory (R. 30-33).
THE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The pla.i~tiff makes the follov./ing assigrunents of error:
1. The verdict of the jury vtas contrary to the great ~eight

Df the evidence and vtas unsupported by the evidence.
2. The Court erred in not directing the jury to return a

verdict in favor of the plain tiff and a gain st the defe-ndant.
3. The Court erred in d:enying plaintiff's motion for ne\v

trial.
4. The Court erred in refusing to give the jury plain tiff's

requested Instruction No. 2 and

Jifl~ 20.6 and 20.8.

5. The Court erred in its failure and refusal to give plaintiffs requcs ted Ins tructi~n No. 5.

6. The Court erred in its f a.il ure to inc Iud e in I n.s truction
No. 4 that the defendant failed to yield the right-of-~Tay to

plaintiff.
7. The Court erred in giving Instruction Ko. 6.
8. The Court erred ln giving Instruction ·~o. 7.

The plaintiff relies upon each of the assignments of error
set forth above and will consider the ass ignm en ts in the f o j Jo v.ring argwnent consisting of tVJt·o different points. Assignment
of error 1:\o. 3, of cour.sej is included in each of the tv.ro argu1_)
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ments as there \\'as sufficient error to justify the granting of a
new trial under each point.

POINT l.
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY~
IN INSTRUCl~IONS NO. 6 AND 7, THAT THE PLAIN.

TIFF WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF

LAW~

AND

ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRuCTION NO+

2)

AND INCLUDING JIFU 20~6 AND

20.8+

Assignments of Error 4, 6~ 7~ and 8.
The Court based, these instructions upon Section 41~6-79j

Utah Code Annotated 1953:
~~pedestrians

shall

yi eJd I igh t-of-way

r -

( a) Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any
point other than w !thin a marked crosswalk or within
an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield
the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadwa. y.

(c) Betv.l een adjacent intersections at which traffic
control signals are in operation pedestrians shaH not
cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk.''
'fh e question i mnl edia tel y arises: Does the intersection
of First Avenue and State Street constitution an intersection ? To

decide this question, we will first look to our own statute
which defines nintersection .. and !tcrosswalk.'~
L'

41·6-8. Intersection----crosswalk.-·

(a) ~"Intersection. n ( 1) The area embraced within
the pro1on ga tion or connection of the lateral curb 1ines 1
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or. if none~ then the lateral boundary lines of the roadways of ~o highways which join one another at, or
approximately at, right angles, or the area within which
vehicles traveling upon different highways joining at
any other angle in conflict.

(b) HCrosswalk:· That part of a roadway at an in~
tersection included within the connections of the lateral
lines of the sidevla lks on opposite sides of the highway
measured from the curbs, or in the absence of curbs,
from the edges of the traversable roadway; any portion
of a roa d\\o· a y at an intersection or elsewhere distinct! y
indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines or other markings on the surf a.ce~ ·

t

l~nder tbat

definition there can be no doubt that it is an
intersection~ The fact that First Avenue stops at State Street
and does not cross beyond State Street v.rould not change the
~ituation. 5 American Jurisprudence, Sec. 288, p~ 662:
t~The \veight of authority is

to the effect that an
~intersection' \vithin the meaning of traffic statutes or
regulations a rj ses from the meeting of one street with
another at an angle, although one of the streets stops
at and does not cross the other~ 0 th er cases require
the streets to cross in order that they shall be considered intersecting streets .. ~ 31 A.L.R. 488 (anna.tation) ~ Junction of two streets may form a highway
intersection with a traffic statute or regulation, although
one of tbem extends only to and not beyond the other
is supported by the weight of authority. 78 A~L.R.
1198-supplemental to 31 A.L.R~ 488, holds the same.
n

It is admitted that at the tin1 e of th c accident there 'vas
a traffic control signal working at North TeinpJe and State

Street and also at South Temple and State Street. If North
Temple and State Street and South Temple and State Street~
17
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vl here there are traffic control 1igh ts, arc ad jaccn t intersections,
then perhaps the lo,vcr Court ~·ould have been right.

The v,ro~d t~ adjacent'' is relative in meaning~ and its con- ·
struction is determined by the context in which it is used in
a statute. Grudnosky v. Bislow, 88 N.W. 2nd 847 (Minn.
19·/13).
State ex rel. Dry man v. District Court of Ninth Judicial
District, Supretne Court of A-fontana, 1954, 276 P (2d) 969.

This Court cited "¥vith approval the definition of
froJn 1 C.J-S., pp~ 1464-1465:

·~adjaccnf'

~~The

vl/ord 'nd j ac:ent' is of Latin derivation from
· ad-jaceo', to ]ie at, or near. It has been said that the
\VOCU has no arbitrary meaning or definition~ but that
t h c tc.rm is a relative and not a de£nite and absol utc
on c ~ and the exact meaning of ..,.,. hich) in any pa rticnl ar
ca sc] is determinable princi pally by the con text in which
it is used~ the facts and circumstances of the case~ the
subject rna tter to \V h 1ch it is applied, or the intent of
th c Lc gi sl a ture or the parties~ and the word is usually
to be given a broad substantial construction and not
limited to the literal tne aning as defined by lexica g·

graphcrs."
1
t

·.

Adjacent'' is defined in Pcti ti oner s of School l)i strict

l\ o. 9, Caddo County, v. Jones] "District Judge, et al., Oklahoma, 1949, 140 P(2J) 922. Therein the definition of the
term, as contained in Webster's Dictionary of Synonyms, is
<-1 u ote d with a. p p rov al as follows :
1

''.Adjacent does not al\vay.s imply actual contact~ but
it doc-S not admit of anything of the same kind between;
th u.s, adjacent 1ots are in contact~ but adjacent houses
Jna }' or may not be."

18
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This definition was approved by Gty of Ada v. Whitaker et al.,
212 P(2d) 482 (Okla. 1949).

The only sensible way to define ~ adjacent'' in the Utah
statute) supra, would be the same as in the two 0 klahoma
cases. Thus~ adjacent inters cctions ~~ou ld not admit of another
intersection between them.
4

The argument might be advanced that if this construction
is a do pted, great inconvenience 'vnu 1d be encoun tercd by the
motorists being ob 1iged to reco gnizc un1nar ked cros sw alks
such as the one in this case. But, on the other hand~ if the Court
should hold adj a.c ent meant . ~near, r, untold confusion and
hardships to the pedestrian ~Tould be the result... 'Nearn is a
generic term and there are streets in this city in fact all over
the state~ where the traffic signals are all the way from three
blocks to a mile apart and the road is intersected by many
streets, none having marked cross~: a} ks. The pedestrian ~~ould
have to walk blocks in order to cross the road. Under the
sensible construction of the \Vord ~·adjacent/~ as set out by
the Oklahoma courts~ it would be a co1nparativel y simple m attc r
for the City to pJace signs at the crosswalks of the intersections
they did not wish the pedestrian to cross. See Sections 41 ~G· 20 ~
1"

41-6·21~

and 41-6-22,

U~C.A. 1953.

It is safe to asswne that the law 'vas originally written
to cover instances like Main Street be tv; cen First and Second
SouthJ Second South and Third South, etc.
The south sidewalk on First A venue extends 1evel to State
Street~ an actual

invitation for pedestrians to cross there. The
conditions are exactly simi 1ar to those on the north side~ except
19
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as to the sign and the painted lines. There is no sign there
d i rccting ped cs tri ans not to cross+ 1~he place

here plaintiff
crossed \vas an un1narked crosswalk as defined by Section
41~6-8,

v/

supra.

'fhc Court, in Instruction No. 6 ~ 1n structed the jury that
the plajnt1ff v/as negligent as a matter of la'v for ~·alking
\vherc she did. In Instruction No. 7, the. Court said she 'va.s
obLiged to yield the right -of-way to defendant's approaching
automobile_ In vie~T of those two instructions, it was impossible
for the plaintiff to recover. The first paragrapJ1 of Instruction
No. B does not help.
"Regardless of the courfs instruction that pJajntlff
was guilty of negligence in cro:s sing where she did and
regardless of v.rhether you shall determine that she
\vas negligent in failing to yleld the right-of-way to
defendant~ if you do so determine~ the court instructs
you.that before either or both of such acts of negligence
will bar pI aint.ltf from recovering her damages from
defendant you must first .find that either one or both of
such act5 of negligence was a proximate, rontributory
cause of the accident and of plaintiff's injuries.~'
1~he fir~t

thing the jury would say .ls that if she hadn't

been in the position which the Court said "''as negligent and
unlawful~ the accident never \VOuld have happened.
The Court's error in giving Instructions No. (-) and 7, and
fa i 1i ng to give plain tiff· s requested instructions as set forth in
the s ta tern en t of the case constituted p rej ud tcial error.

20
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POINT II.
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY WAS CONTRARY TO
THE GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE
COURT ERRED IN NOT DIRECTING THE JURY TO
RETURN A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF.
Assignments of Error 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

If the plaintiffs contention is correct in Point I, then she
was crossing State Street in an unmarked cross~ralk~ as defined

by subdivision (b), Section

41~6-8~ U.C.A~

1953. In that
event. the plaintiff had the right~of-way over the defendant
who was making his left turn south on State Street.
Subdivision (a), Section 41-6-78, U+C.A. 1953:

Pedestrians' right-of-way. - (a) When traffic~
control signals are not in place or not in operation
the driver of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-wayj
slowing do'Arn or stopping if need be to so yield, to
a pedes t t ian cto ssing the road v,· ay within a crossw a.lk
when the pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway
upon which the vehicle is traveling) or -~vhen the pedestrian is approaching so closely from the opposite half
of the road \\'~a y as to be in danger, but no pedestrian
shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety
and wa.lk or run into the path of a vehicle which is
so close that it is impossible for the driver to yield.
This provision shall not apply under the conditions
stated in 41-6-78(b) ,"
4

-t

Coombs v.

Perry~ 2

Utah 389, 275 P(2d) 680

Mingus v. Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P (2d) 495
Smith v. Bennett~ 1 Utah 2nd 224, 265 P (2d) 401
21
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1~he -~vriters are 1nindfui of the pedestrian's obligations.

The pedestrian s right-of~ v.,r a y is not absolute. The pedestrian
has a right -of~ \\ a y, but not a right to self- inflicted rna yh em for
TW hich the de fen dan t can· be held liabLe. l\.fingus v. 0 lsson,
t

1

7

supra.

Where a pedestrian failed to look} or having looked,
failed to see what he should have seen and paid heed to, the
cases ho1d is negligence~ but by the saln e to ken, the motorist
bas sorne d u.ties too As V!las so aptly said in Jur isch v. Puget
Tranportation (~(L, Supreme Court of Washington~ 1927, 258
Pac. 39:
7

~1£ the conceded right of

way means anything at
all) it puts the necessity of continuous o bs erva tion and
avoidance of injury upon the driver of the automobil~
w·hen approaching a crossing~ just as the necessity o£
the case puts the same higher degree of care upon the
pedestrian at other places than at crossings.''
Cro.ss ings are there es pecia ll y for pedestrians, and motorisn

in approaching them must bear this in mind. The driver of
an automobile should al \va ys be aware of the fact that pedestrians rna y be eros sing a street at intersections and that pedestrians so crossing the street are entitled to the right-of--way.
'I o conclusively show that the de£ en dant was guilty of
negligence in this case and that the plaintiff was free from
contributory ncg1igcnce~ let us look at the record. The plain~

tiff, eighty-four years of age at tba t time, stopped on the west
curb of State St rce t) imm edia tel y facing the cross w a.lk on the
south side of the intersection of State Street and First Avenue.
She looked up and down to see if there v..' ere any cars. There
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weren't any. There was no car coming down First Avenue
that had c n te red the intersection and so she decided to cross.
The plaintiff had a. right to presume that a motorist who might
come down First Avenue v.rould stop at the stop sign, and
before making his left hand turn, exercise due care to ascertain
that such movement could be made with reasonable safety.
She 1;va lk ed a. few steps straight east toward the south si d e\valk
of First Avenue and \vas struck. That is all she remembered.

It is undisputed that there was a he aVJ ~ ~· et snowstorm
at the time. The defendant was driving west on First Avenue,
and in tended turning south on State Street. His v isi bi lity ~T as
poor and the snow was pla5tering on the windshield (R. 3·1).
His right £ron t \Vindow and his left front window' were fogged.
He could only see through the sweep of the windshield wiper
(R. 38). He could see straight ahead, but couldn~t see to the
left or right. He stopped at the stop sign~ aceo rding to his
testimonyj and after looking to the north and south, as he said,
and there \\'as no traffic~ made a normalle£ t hand turn ( R. 36) .
If he wa5 facing west~ he would have had great cliff iculty seeing
any appreciable distance to the north or to the south. He could
only see prac tic ally straight in front of him.
The de£ en dan t first to1d off ice r Lescoe that he saw 11 rs.
Langlois thirty or forty feet fro 1n t hc point of impact. Then at
the trial he said that he sa "\V her ten or hvclv e f cct. In his
general statement to officer Lescoe:r he said he didn't see her
un ti 1 he was practical Iy on top of her. However, at the trial
he was very sure that he first sa~' her three to four feet east
of the west curb. There is no qucs tion that Mrs. Langlois ~'as
struck fourteen feet east of the west curb.
J

2

~

·'
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This eighty-fourwyear~old woman walked from ten to
eleven feet from the point defendant first saw her to the point
where she was struck. According to one part of defendanfs
testimony~ that he saw her ten or eleven feet away, then his

car had to be going the same speed as the plaintiff. If such
~·ere the case, he

could havc stopped. Obviously, his sta tern ent

in that regard is wrong~ If the defendant, as is claimed, was

Via tching Mrs. Langlois

\V

alking across the street with a paper

over her head from three feet from the west curb to the point
v.r here sh c vilas strue k fourteen £eet east of the curb, it would
clearly appear that he had two choices to make. First, he could
have cut over to the v.,r est side of State Street and missed her.

Second, he could have stopped. Had the defendant, as he once
told the officer, seen the plaintiff thirty or forty feet away, he
could have stopped his car unless he was speeding. In either
event~ he 1;vould have been negligent

The third alternative is that the defendant, either on
a ceo unt of inattention on his part or on account of the snow
on the v./ indshi el d and the fog on the windows, failed to see
the plaintiff. He proceeded to make the left hand turn and
~·as~ as he said in another part of his testimony~ rlgh t on top
of her before he sa\v her. At any rate~ he knocked or pushed
Jvlrs. Langlois a distance of eleven or twelve feet south~ where
she v.ras picked up.
Any one of the above alternatives demonstrates the de.

fendant's negligence beyond a peradventure of a doubt. The

defendknant didthn'tt
h ave

OVv'n

a

sh~un~

.any warnibng, yedt hedknew or sh~uhld
ts vlston was o scure an someone m1g t

be on tbe cros.swalk. T'he law is correctly stated in plaintiffs
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,j

requested Instruction No. 5~ taken from 72 A.L.R. 1352. A motorist shou Id be able to stop within the range of his vision.
~~If

his vision is obscured by sno\V ~ sleet or fog on
the windshield or windows so that he cannot see the
required distance ahead, or to the side as the case rna y
be, he must, within such distance from the point of
such 1ack of vis ion~ bring his car to such con tro 1 that
he can stop immediatelyt and if he cannot then seeJ
should stop.~'
The cases on automobile and pedestrian are legion and
many case5 have gone so £ar as to indicate that a pedestrian
should anticipate almost anything that a careless motorist
migh~ do. Such is not the law here nor should it be. Was Mrs~
Langlois., the plaintiff here, required to anticipate that someone
coming west on First Avenue .and State Street~ v,rith his vision
obscured by snow and fog on windshield and windovls, ~Tau 1d
carelessly and negligently run into her?

· Mrs. Langlois was not contributorily negligent. A recent
Personal Injury Newsletter reviewed) as they said, 1: two beau tifully written opinions' r from Michigan in which the Court
held PEDESTRIAN IS NOT A ~~LEGAL SITTING DUCK.t'
The Court said;
l

1:~The

test of contributory negligence is not \1lhether
the plain tiff did all that he concei va b1y could have
done or even all that, in retrospect, it is obvious he
should have done. Plaintiff did fail to make a proper
estimate of defendanfs proximity through the v.~indoVitTS
of the double-par ked car. PI a in tiff did £aiL to an tic ip atc
defendant's swerve into the other side of the street.
Plaintiff did fail to make a correct decision on the
direction from which his greatest danger might come.
But~ asked the court~ ~Can we -=.really say that these
25
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failures of judgment ~rete such as to ~e u~deba.t.ably
outside tb e realm of conduct of the orduiartl y prudent
person? ~ .. As the power and acceleration of the
au tomo b ll e have increased, the effectiveness of the
evasive action of the pedestrian has declined ...· . This
Court shou Id not leave the pedestrian a legal sitting
duck.' " Ware v. Nelson~ 88 NW 2nd 524 (Mich.
w

1958)

+

The dec1sion 1n the Ware case was rendered on March 5~ 1958.
A day earlier, the 1\1ich1gan court held in Bartlett v. Melzo,
88 NW 2nd 518 (Mich. 1958):

"At COJnmon lav.ll unaided by statute or o~dlnance~
th c rights of pedestrians and motorists at crossings
~~ere said to be equal. It was the duty of each to exer
cis e d u.e care. nut a dis tinction is drawn in the I a w of
negligence between standard and amount of care (emphasis by the court) ~ A motorist must exercise a greater . ;
amount of care than a. pedestrian+ The motorist has
under his contro 1 an in:s truru en tali ty capable of inflict~ .I
ing great bodily harm upon relatively slight impact .· ~:!
and at .slight risk to himself. This aspect of the la·w of ·.· ·'
negligence has not received the emphasis demanded
by its si gni£ cance in the motorist-pedestrian cases. This 1
is one reason \vhy the common Jaw rule of reciprocal -~
rights .and duties has not sufficed to protect pedestrians
from the hazards of ever· increasing automobile traffic.
Legislative bodies have sought other solutions and have
·given the pedestrian the right of way at street crossings~ The san1c ordinance is involved in this case as
was involved in Moldenhauer v ~ Smith~ 311 Mich.
265j 18 N\V 2nd 818 ( 1945). In that caseJ despite the
r1gh t of \1\-• a y given the pedestrian by the ordinance
he 'vas held to be contributorily negligent as a matter
of la \\~. The Mold cnh.a uer case erroneously interpreted:::_·;~:·
the ordinance and is overruled. The ordinance entitles ·
the pedestrian to positive preferential treatment at
w

I

l

1
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eros swal ks. The care required of the motorist goes
beyond the common law rule of ordinary care. 'We
do not sit to rende.r nugatory the efforts of our people
to protect their lives and limbs. The ordinance places
upon the motorist certain aH irmative duties; He must
approach a cros·swalk at such moderate speed as to
be able to yield the right of way to a pedestrian crossing
therein~ and be able to bring his car to a. complete stop,
if nee essary, to accord the pedestrian his right of \V a y. ~
nThe tenor of the decision in the Bartlett case is
probably best expressed by these wo_rds of the court:
'We look with horror upon ancient rites involving
h urn an sacrifice. We take prid~ in our progression fr0111
the sacrifice of the 6rst~born son~ to the lamb, then to
the abolition of sacrifice en tir ely) yet historians of the
future may well note that it v.ras a common sight in
our cities in this era to observe the citizens of the comm unity running for their lives~ literally, if ca. ugh t in
the center of the street by a changing traffic light.
Those not so nimble as others perish in greater numbers. The decedent v.rhose case is before us was 76
years of age~ Whether he was able to run or not the
record does not disclose. When asked if the decedent
began to run when the traffic started moving, as he
was leaving the center of the road, a witness replied
that ~the first couple of steps he ·~val ked. t ~ The next
question: ""Did he run after that ?n A. \'He speeded it
up.'' r Concludes the court, ,Not~ certainly, enough.~ t~
4

¥rs~

Langlois had a right to cross 'vhere she did. It was
not incumbent upon her to use the north marked inter section.
If it could be said that she should have gone there~ then it
could be said that s.he should have walked either to North
Temple or to South Temple where signal lights made it even
safer to cross. The p 1ainti ff was not con tributor i 1y negligent
and the Court erred in failing to direct a verdict in her favor.
27
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Even in. the event the lower Court was right and the

p1a in tiff Ut' as not in a mar ked crosswaJ k as d efi.ned by Section
41 -6-8, she still would have been en titled to recover. Pedestrians
rus torn a.r il y crossed State Street V-.JT here this acdden t ocrur ted.
The defendant \vas familiar ~'tth that intersection and he had
seen people cross at that point. He knew pedestrians crossed
there and knew that they m1 ght be using that area at any time.
Therefore~ having that know ledge, he had the duty to drive at
that point ~· ith the same care and caution as if it were an actual
tna r ked pedestrian lane.
Morgan v. Domino; La. App. 166 S. 208 (1936):
~ . Considering

defendant's know ledge that the: place
in question ~T as c"u stomaril y used by pedestrians as a
crossing, the principle of law governing motorists and
pedestrians at pub lie crossings or street intersections
.in the absence of statutes or ordinances is applicable.
This pr inci p Je is that motorist and the pedestrian have
equality of right in the use of the crossing, and each
must exercise such right with reasonable regard for
the safety and convenience of others.':>

MilJer v. Tiedemannj 94 A. 835, 249 Pa. 234 (191_5):
~'"It

is true Mr. Miller was not crossing street ar
the end of a block, sti 11 he \vas doing so at a paint which
de£ end ant~ s ch au[cur kn ev.r was customarily and very
generally used for that purpose.
B

The Court erred in not instructing the jury that the platnttH had the right-of v.:ay. In fact, w1der the circumstances, the
Court should have instructed the jury to bring in a verdict in
favor of the p1ain tiff and against the clefen dan t.
All the a.ssignment:s of error complained of were prejudicial.28
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CONCLUSION

This case is another illusttation of the hazard of driving
an automobile during a heavy wet snowstorm. Here~ the only
\:jsibility the defendant h.ad was through the S'~Neep of the
windshield wiper. His side win dow s, according to defendant's
own testimony~ were fogged. If the windows were fogged the
probability is that the windshield was also fogged. When a
pedestrian comes into view from either side in circumstances
such as this., he often appears to come suddenly. Instead of
excusing a driver~ it only adds to the degree of care required.
Instructions No. 6 and 7 given by the Court were clearly

erroneous. North Temple and South Temple are not adjacent
intersections any more than Salt Lake City and Sacramento .are
adjacent state capitals; Carson City intervenes~ The pI aintiff
had the right-of-way~ The plaintiff did everything required
of a pedestrian in crossing the str~et. She did not have the
agility of a university athlete to jump out of the way and even
a uni ver si ty athlete) in this case~ ~-ou ld have been beset with
d.ifficul ties had he tried to escape the on coming car. The de~
fe.ndant was driving too fast for existing conditions, especially
in view of poor visibility and a heaYy, wet snowstorm.
Where£ ore, your appellant prays that this Court reverse

the trial Court and enter j u dgm en t for the plain tiff.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY S. McCARTY and
C. VERNON LANGLOIS

AtlorneJS for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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